THE PAMIRS' POPULATION AS VIEWED BY THE RUSSIAN MILITARY

At the beginning of the 20th century the Pamir was thoroughly explored by Russian military experts, especially in military topographical, geographical, ethnical- demographic and confessional aspects. The military reports were partially published, with their distribution being, of course, intended for service use only.

So, for instance, all through the summer of 1907 captain of the General Staff A.K. Razgonov was making an expedition in the Pamir, moving to the upper reaches of the river Piandj. In his book, published later by the headquarters of the Turkestan military district in 1910, he gave a detailed description of his impressions of the Pamir. He emphasized that this mountainous region's political and military importance was in its geographic position, at the meeting point of three powers - Russia, China and England. The Pamir's middle location, Razgonov wrote, is the reason of the political and military interest it represents: " Extending to the south of our borders towards India, it is our natural window to over there".

The Pamir started playing an important role in geopolitical and geo-strategic plans of Russia and other leading powers of the beginning of the century.

The 1895 British - Russian agreement on delimitating the Mountainous Badakhshan was based upon its division not according to the ethnic principle, but to the geographic one, proceeding from the configuration of the borders to be favourable to both sides. That agreement, concluded with no consultations with Afghanistan, came to be the result of the British-Russian rivalry of many years in that region. The Pamir elite's position was of great importance for Russia's shaping its stance with respect to the mountainous frontier. As N. Yemelianova believes, the Pamir's voluntary joining to Russia occurred at the insistence of the Ismaelites' religious leaders (2).

"They do not regard Russians as infidels and associate with them willingly…"

At the same time, the Pamir Ismaelite-Tajiks, as captain Razgonov pointed out, in what pertained to their spiritual life obeyed to the Aga Khan (1877-1957), the Ismaelites' imam, resident in Bombay (3). That fact made a controversial impression on soviet historians. According to Yemelianova, as a result, Ismailism is regarded in the works of some historians and philosophers as a reactionary trend, which at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century turned into "agents" of British Imperialism (4).

Such a complicated situation required new approaches and trustworthy sources. According to captain Razgonov's information, the West Pamir's population was made up of Tajik-Ismaelites, whose number reached 25 thousand people at the beginning of the 20th century. The Eastern Pamir's population comprised the Kara-Kirghiz (today's Kirghiz), who roamed from place to place in the valleys of the rivers and lakes. The Kirghiz numbered then up to 2.5 thousand people. The Pamir Tajiks lived mainly in the river valleys of the Piandj's tributary streams, in the most fertile ravines (5).

The mutual relations between the Tajik-Sunnites and Ismaelites were an important component of the Pamir highlanders' attitude towards the Russians. The persecuted in all the countries of the Orient Ismaelites' belief served to cause an extremely scornful attitude of the population of Bukhara, Afghanistan, Kashgaria and Kokand khanate, who professed Sunnism, towards the Pamirians. Most of the local rulers were also Sunnites, regarding with disdain the native inhabitants of the West Pamir, as B. I. Iskanderov wrote in the 1960s (6). On the contrary, the Russian military, as well as officials later on, showed a respectful attitude towards the religion of the Pamir inhabitants.

Russian military specialists attributed special importance to studying the local population's psychology. The General Staff Academy's graduate A. E. Snesarev, who served in Turkestan from 1899, mentioned in his "guide" that in observers' opinion, the Pamir highlanders' character was notable for such features as patience, gentleness, strong will, reticence and endurance. They, in his view, had great fantasy and were fond of living by fancies (7).

According to captain Razgonov's impressions, the customs and views of the Tajik-Ismaelites and Tajik-Sunnites differ largely, the Ismaelites being "milder and not fanatic" (8). Though the difference between the Ismaelites and Sunnites was explained rather superficially- from his point of view - such a situation was due to the fact that the Ismaelites' religion was allegedly a "mixture" of Islam and Buddhism. However, further along captain Razgonov makes a conclusion practical enough: "They are very tolerant to other believes and not fanatics in the least, they do not regard Russians as infidels and associate with them willingly..., are devoted to us, deserving attention on our part, too" (9).

With respect to the Pamirians' religion the Russian military were attentive enough not leave unnoticed the difference between Ismailism and Shiism. Ismailism, which is considered now by many orientalists to be one of the trends of Islam, close to Shiite Islam, in the Pamir's condition had many peculiarities. Snesarev noticed that because of the Tajik-highlanders' reticent character "it's quite common to come across an erroneous interpretation of their religion", for example, the West Pamir's inhabitants had been long considered to be Shiites. The military orientalist disagreed with the wide-spread then ascribing of the Pamir Tajiks to the Shiites, for he himself ran into cases when the Ismaelites "made themselves pass for Sunnites or Shiites on account of some considerations" (10).

Razgonov also added that the Ismaelites were thoroughly concealing the dogmas of their religion and even among themselves there were not many initiated into them. Only the most reliable people of a quite venerable age knew the essence of all the religious believes and rites (11).

The local population's main occupation was tillage and, to a smaller degree, cattle-breeding. However, there was a shortage of arable land, and great many of the locals lived in deep poverty. Under those conditions the help provided to the Pamirians by the command of the Pamir detachment was of great importance for them.

"For distinguished services beyond the prescribed duties…"

According to captain Razgonov's information, the Pamir detachment was made up of 185 soldiers and officers. The unit was stationed in five posts: in Korog, Pamir, Kizil-Rabat, Liangar and Ishkashim (12).

In 1896 Karl Kivekes, of a Swedish descent, from Finland, came to serve in the detachment. In 1905 he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and appointed commander of the Pamir Detachment. For his service in the Pamir Kivekes was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd degree, St. Anne, 3rd degree. In 1907 he was decorated with the Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree - "for distinguished services in peace time, beyond the prescribed duties".

Having become commander of the frontier-guarding detachment, as his service testimonial reads, "thanks to his outstanding working ability and energy he managed to raise the detachment scattered over hundreds of miles from post to post up to the due mark in every respect".

Lieutenant-colonel Kivekes showed care to the local population no less than to his soldiers. Thanks to his chivalrous disinterestedness, wide material support for the poor and approachability for all people he won affection and respect of the entire population. The commander of the Pamir detachment built aryks (irrigation ditches) and irrigated fields, increasing by doing so lands under cultivation; loaned seeds to sow fields, let the Pamirians know how to cultivate potato, cabbage and other crops non-habitual in the mountains… In general, he exerted a great influence in spreading culture among the population. The so far unpublished Kivekes's memoirs contain a detailed description of the Pamir, its inhabitants, their religions, attitude towards Russia, the Russian military and the like.

One of the most detailed works among the Russian military sources in describing the population of the Pamir area awaits its explorers.

Lev Davydovitch Trotzky and the Ismaelits' reticence

According to Snesarev, it was difficult to determine what the political mood of the Pamir Tajiks was, "whether they still want to remain under the rule of Bukhara, are angling to cling to the Russians, or perhaps, finally, think about getting under the Afghan emir". In general, Snesarev noted, "they are fond of the Russian ways and customs, especially in what concerns our justice, but, on the other hand, they as if got accustomed to a considerable extent, or, to be more exact, used to be submitted to the Bukhara regime. It is most likely that their political mood is notable for a sort of indifference, and only somewhere in the recesses of the people's consciousness there is, perhaps, a remote hope, kept hidden, to come to be protected by the White Czar. The Tajiks are too closed-in, too scared of the Bukhara rulers to show up their inner most dreams; besides, they are too absorbed in economic and agricultural routines to be able to grasp vaster political views".

With the outbreak of World War I, the Russian military were, naturally, worried about the true attitude of the Pamirians to Russia.

Initially the military's concern seemed unnecessary. The Ismaelites' spiritual leader Aga Khan addressed the Muslims, exhorting them to come out against Germany and Turkey in support for the Triple Entente. "The Muslims, he wrote, are to remain faithful to the duty of oath and obedient to our state and spiritual authorities…No one will be able to win a victory over so powerful sovereigns like the Emperor of India, the King of England and the czar of all Russia…" (14). The Pamir Ismaelites guided themselves with those instructions, keeping loyalty to the Russian czar.

After the October Revolution the Aga Khan joined the side of its adversaries. Accordingly, when in 1917 the Pamirians took power in the mountainous area in their hands, some of them turned to the Bukhara emir for help. They were also aided by the fact that when the Bolsheviks formed in Tashkent a military unit in the beginning of 1918 to substitute the former frontier guards, the new detachment passed over to the basmatches (counter-revolutionary combatants) .

When in 1918 the Bolsheviks' plot of a world revolution in Europe was a failure, they turned their attention to the East. The Russian Bolsheviks also engaged in the "oriental trend" Enver-pasha, a Turk dignitary, very famous among the Muslims of Central Asia. In 1919 Enver-pasha arrived in Moscow to hold talks with V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, L.D. Trotzky over a project of sovietization of Central Asia, India, China and Afghanistan.

As a result, according to the instructions of Lev Davydovitch Trotzky, the Revvoensoviet (Revolutionary Military Soviet)'s Field Staff elaborated, under general A.A. Brusilov's leadership, a plan of a campaign for the Red Army's cavalry troops to march through the mountain chains of Gindukush, Tibet, Tien Shan and the Himalayas eastwards to Afghanistan, India, Nepal and China. All Central Asia, the former czarist Turkestan, should have been sovietized in extremely short period of time, being turned into a base for a grandiose "oriental campaign".

Naturally, the Pamirians were also involved in the plan, being residents of the geopolitical region, decisive for the cause of a world revolution. The situation of the Pamir Tajiks became extremely complicated with the advent of Bolsheviks. In a rather short period of time the Soviet troops managed to re-establish control over the mountain passes on the borders of the former Russian Empire.

As some investigators, for example A. Shakhov, believe, the Pamirians took the arrival in the region of the first Bolsheviks with great enthusiasm (15). If so, does it mean that the local spiritual authorities and leaders of the Pamirians decided to disobey the Aga Khan's will? Was it actually so? Were the Pamir Tajiks "spies of the British Imperialism", or were they frank in being in the first ranks of those who accepted the Soviet power? Can there be simple answers to these questions?

Geopolitics should not push to the background the importance of relations with the local population

To restore the historical truth, it is necessary to resort to trustworthy documents, to consider the evidence of such military explorers as A.K. Razgonov, K. Kivekes, A.E. Snesarev. It is extremely necessary to do so now, when the situation of the isolated Russian contingent - the Frontier-guarding Group of the FFS (Federal Frontier-Guard Service)b of the RF in the Republic of Tajikistan - depends to no small degree not only on clashes with narcotics traffickers and combatants, but also on contacts with the local population.

The attitude of the ethnic and religious groups of the Pamir towards Russia's presence in the region replicates now largely that prevailing at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In a not big region - the Mountainous Badakhshan autonomous province of the Republic of Tajikistan - there are serious clashes of geopolitical and geo-economic interests of China, the USA, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, CIS Central Asian states. Taking into consideration Russia's current military and economic weakness, it is advisable to be especially attentive to studying all possible after-effects of these or those steps it takes.

As is acknowledged by many investigators of the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, even putting aside the question whether it was reasonable to bring the troops into that country, it could have been possible, at any rate, to avoid many errors, had the forms of maintaining mutual relations with the ethnic groups of Afghan provinces been pondered over more thoroughly (16). Though, in reality, "large" geopolitical problems, for instance rivalry with the USA, came to the fore. The self-dependence of the local population was underestimated, and that cost lives to thousands of soviet soldiers, while hundreds of thousands of civilians were left roofless.

Sources used:

1. Razgonov A.K. Through Eastern Bukhara and Pamir. Tashkent, 1910, p. 94-95

2. Yemelianova N. Ismailism in the Pamir // Russia and Muslim world. 1997 № 9, p. 83.

3. Razgonov A.K. The work referred to, p. 101.

4. Yemelianova N. The work referred to, p. 86.

5. Razgonov A.K. The work referred to, p. 101

6. Iskanderov B.I. Eastern Bukhara and the Pamir in the period of Central Asia's joining to Russia. Stalinabad, 1960, p. 63.

7. Snesarev A.E. Eastern Bukhara. St.Ptg., 1906, p. 39.

8. Razgonov A.K. The work refered to, p. 80.

9. Same work. P. 101-102.

10. Snesarev A.E. The work referred to, p. 40

11. Razgonov A.K. The work referred to, p.102

12. Same work, p. 104.

13. Snesarev A.E. The work referred to, p. 41.

14. Quot.: Klimovitch L.I. Islam. Essay. M., 1962, p.144

15. Shakhov A. Why the Tajiks kill the Tajiks? The regional ethnical real estate of the conflict // Russia and Muslim world. 1994 № 10, p. 52

Liakhovsky A.A. Tragedy and Prowess of Afghanistan. Moscow, 1997.

About the author: ISKHAKOV Salavat Midkhatovitch - senior scientific officer of the RAS Institute of Russian History, scientific secretary of the Scientific Council of the RAS for history of social reforms, movements and revolutions.

Salavat ISKHAKOV, specially for the "TransCaspian Project"

04.12.2000